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LIBERAL GLOBALIZATION AND PERIPHERAL JUSTICE

Weigang Chen

Abstract

The increasing salience of cultural conflicts in the post-Cold War era brings the problem of
peripheral justice, defined as the equal attainment of social justice, to the center of current
debates on globalization. Specifically, they force us to directly confront the toughest
challenge posed by the Weberian tradition: If the principles of justice and equality are
beyond the peculiarity of the Occidental civilization, how then may we give a full explanation
as to why in the West-and only in the West-the ideal ofpublic reasoning by private people
has been materialized? The present study seeks to address this fundamental challenge by
drawing on the Marxist tradition of public hegemony developed by Confucian Marxists and
Gramsci. I argue that at the core of the problem of peripheral justice is an intrinsic linkage
between Eurocentricism and the liberal paradigm of "civil society." The prospect of equal
justice, therefore, hinges on the development of a new conception of the "social" that
reverses the liberal interpretation of the relationship between bourgeois subjectivity and the
"social" and derives from the primacy of the ethical life for social formation.
The Liberal Empire or Peripheral Justice?

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 stimulated high aspirations for the universal
benefits of democratic reasoning and market-oriented thinking (Held, 1993 p. 249). Liberal
democracy was proclaimed as the "end of history"--1:hat is, "the final form of human
government" (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 3). This sense of exhilaration was most manifest in the
phenomenal rise of a variety of theories of liberal globalization that celebrated a new epoch
of human history in which, as a result of the erosion of the division between industrialized
center/non-industrialized peripheral regions, transnational corporations and global
institutions of liberalism would eventually supplant traditional nation-states as the principal
agents of world society (Ohmae, 1995, p. 5; Amin, 1997, pp. 2-3). Throughout the 1990s,
this perception was used by both neo-liberals and neo-Marxists as the cornerstone of their
analyses of the post-Cold War world order (Held et aI, 1999, p. 3; Hirst and Thompson,
1999).
But even before the ink was dry on paper, these arguments had already been made
obsolete by the emerging trends in the post-Cold War world. Since the mid-1990s, it has
become increasingly evident that what has replaced the rivalry between the Communist East
and the West is not the advance of a global liberal civilization but, on the contrary, the
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growing fragmentation of nations into cultural blocs and ethnic enclaves. Indeed, one does
not need to embrace Samuel Huntington's theory of the civilizational clash to recognize the
increasing salience of cultural and ethnic conflict in global politics today (Huntington, 1996).
Recent major developments in the non-Western world, from the spectacular growth of
Islamic fundamentalism in Muslim countries to the rapid ascendancy of Confucian
nationalism in East Asia, I all demonstrate indisputably that culture and cultural identities
have become the driving force in the current age of globalization.
Beneath the intensification of cultural and religious conflicts in today's world is a
perennial question that has haunted social analysts ever since the nineteenth century: Why
does liberal democracy triumph in the West but become a standard recipe for social and
economic disasters throughout the peripheral world (de Soto, 2000)? This dilemma of
peripheral liberal deformation has found its most powerful expression in our world today.
The eager tum of former communist and developing nations to the free-market economy and
liberal democracy has not ushered in an unequivocal flowering of capitalism. Instead, the
imposition of the liberal orthodoxy, including privatization of the public sector, the
emasculation of the state apparatus, and the insistence on electoral reform, has directly
contributed to anarchy, civil wars, and economic stagnation (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 175). The
disastrous social and political integration in these countries contrasts sharply with the
remarkable economic growth of East Asian countries, whose rapid rise into the epicenter of
global capitalism has stemmed precisely from their effective implementation of a
deliberately illiberal, de-Westernized, and state-centered strategy of development. 2
Such a striking contrast, as Fukuyama recently concedes, renders it abundantly clear
that the powerlessness and poverty in today's world are due not to the excessive power of
nation-states, but to their weakness. "The solution is not to undermine sovereignty but to
build stronger states in the developing world" (Fukuyama, 2004). In this regard,
globalization defined as the expansion of capitalism to non-Western regions presupposes and
simply relies on a structural differentiation between Western democratic states and peripheral
developmental states. Simply put, globalization is actually the new manifestation of the
deepening of the core/periphery polarization.
I In 1993, Hanoi published, at great expense, a romanized Vietnamese translation (in fifteen volumes
with almost eight thousand pages) of "The Imperially Authorized Compendium ofInstitutions and Institutional
Cases of the Great South" ("The Great South" was the Vietnamese imperial name for Vietnam, adopted in the
late 1830s). The "Compendium ofInstitutions" had been compiled originally in classical Chinese by senior
mandarins of the Vietnamese court at Hue in the I 840s. It was supposed to be an encyclopedic handbook of the
Vietnamese government on the principles of bureaucratic Confucianism. The communist state translators of
this voluminous work bragged of their determination to ensure that libraries, schools, cultural agencies, and
even every family library aU over Vietnam would obtain copies of their translation. The translation and
impressive popularization of this massive work in the 1990s clearly demonstrates a powerful renewal ofthe
national interest in the country's pre-colonial Confucian legacy (Woodside, 1997, pp. 68-69).
2 For a more detailed analysis of the dilemma of peripheral liberal deformation and its manifestations
in the post-Cold War world, see my article "Peripheral Justice: The Marxist Tradition of Public Hegemony and
Its Implications in the Age of Globalization," positions: east asia cultures critique 13/1 (2005), forthcoming.
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It is in this paradoxical suture of economic globalization and political polarization
that we may discern the real source of the most profound contradictions of today's world
order. Due to the persistence ofperipheral liberal deformation, de-liberalization or the statecentered model of development constitutes an indispensable precondition for the upward
mobility of a peripheral nation within the capitalist world system controlled by Western
powers. The irony is that the more a peripheral nation achieves economic success within the
world system, the more it is exposed to the dictation of the global market regulated by liberal
norms, and the more it is forced to give up its only means of survival within the system--the
ethical State. Not surprisingly, the past decades have witnessed a burgeoning movement
across the peripheral world that seeks to "Confucianize" or "Islamize" modernity by
effectively resisting Western values, institutions, and practices (Kepel, 1994).
An appropriate point of reference for considering the dilemma of peripheral liberal
deformation may be found in the idea of the primacy of justice as explicated by Rawls.
Social justice, defined as the basic structure of society, presupposes the existence of a prepolitical state of nature and the possibility of a public perspective shared by the contracting
parties, which, ironically, may least likely exist in the absence of a political order. The
perplexity highlights the centrality of the "duality of human existence" for collective action
(Durkheim, 1973, pp. 149-166), accounting for the predominance of political society in premodern social formations, notably the fundamental contrast between the public realm of the
polis and the private realm of economic activities in Greek city-states (Macintyre, 1984;
Arendt, 1954, p. 12f). Seen from this perspective, the primacy of justice presupposes what
Arendt has characterized as "the rise of the social" (Arendt, 1954, p. 38f) --the elevation of
the private realm of labor into the public realm or, more simply, the institutionalization of
private people's public use of reason (Habermas, 1989). Framed as such, the "social" or civil
society assumes the possibility that private people can reason publicly. The question, of
course, is how this is possible.
This perplexity allows us to understand why the Kantian notion of moral autonomy or
similar constructs about bourgeois subjectivity has been so centrally important to the se1funderstanding of the modem West. According to this deontological view of the modem
se1fhood, the bourgeois as the privatized individual is actually two things in one: bourgeois
and homme. On the one hand, the bourgeois as the owner of goods is profoundly caught up in
the requirements of the market and thus subject to empirical inclinations. On the other hand,
however, the bourgeois as human being is the subject of pure interiority that follows its own
laws and not any external purpose. This peculiar human subjectivity promises liberation from
the constraints of what exists, whether it refers to the prescription of culture or the necessity
oflife (Habermas, 1989, p. 55). For this reason, the split between the bourgeois public sphere
and the market place, which is constitutive of the bourgeois "social" in the West, is best
analyzed as the institutional expression of bourgeois subjectivity--i.e., the duality of the
bourgeois personality.
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It is noteworthy how global uneven development seems to have counter affirmed but
at the same time reaffirmed the liberal paradigm of the "social." While the prevalence of
capitalist deformation across the peripheral world has called into question the liberal claim to
the priority of bourgeois subjectivity and thus confirmed the Hegelian assertion on the
primacy of political society for public life, the same phenomenon-- simply by being a
distinctively peripheral occurrence-has, simultaneously and paradoxically, underscored the
decisive role of the bourgeois class in the formation and reproduction of Western democratic
societies.
This paradox accounts for the ever-lasting sway of the Weberian civilizational
analysis over theoretical analyses of the modem world order. In his famous comparative
studies on the "economic ethics" of the Chinese, Indian, Hebrew, and Protestant civilizations,
Weber conceded that liberal democracy, defined as a polity on the basis of a consensual
contract among autonomous, rights-bearing individuals, may provide little solution to the
dilemma of collective action characteristic of a market society. It does not follow, however,
that the Kantian theses on the primacy of justice and moral autonomy are purely
philosophical speculations. Rather, they are abstract reflections on the concrete cultural and
political processes in the historical development of the Occident civilization. Kant is
certainly right in asserting that the cognitive evolution from substantive rationality to
formalistic rationality, from the primacy of the ethical life to the primacy of justice holds a
key to the emergence of legal domination and rational capitalism in the West. What Kant has
overlooked is the fact that such an evolutionary process is itself rooted primarily in the
particularity of the religious or cultural orientation of the Occidental civilization and,
therefore, is historically contingent and culturally specific. It is these unique cultural traits
that account for the predominance of civic norms and networks of civic engagement in
Western core countries, which breed and sustain "an individualistic ethics of conscience and
responsibility" and hence the practice of public reasoning by private people (Ingram, 1987, p.
45; Schluchter, 1981, p. 62f; Putnam, 1993). By contrast, the absence of such civic roots in
non-Western societies would create a kind of "uncivic" capitalist system in which
"[d]efection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and stagnation intensify one
another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles" (Putnam, 1993, p. 177). In this setting
one should only expect a Hobbesian or Hegelian solution, which compensates for
instabilities through authoritarian institutions.
The whole point of Weberianism is that, precisely because the transition from
political society to civil society as anticipated by classical theorists is normally impossible,
the developmental history of the West must have arisen out of certain religio-cultural
contingencies unique to the Occidental civilization, which alone may breed the crucial
precondition for the public reorientation of private wealth- bourgeois subjectivity.
In view of the increasing salience of cultural conflicts in the post-Cold War era, it is
hardly surprising the Weberian civilizational scheme has made its dramatic return in recent
years. The most visible concretization of this neo-Weberian surge is Huntington's "Clash of
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Civilizations" thesis. "Western concepts," according to Huntington, differ fundamentally
from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism,
constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets,
the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian,
Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures" (Huntington, 1993). For this reason,
peripheral modernization and Westernization cannot but be entirely distinct. The enhanced
resources brought about by Third World modernization are thus put at the disposal of a
political agenda hostile to the West (Huntington, 1996, p. 20). The great divisions among
humankind and the dominating source of conflict in the 21st century, accordingly, will be
cultural or civilizational.
The rise of neo-W eberianism brings into sharp focus the fundamental limits of
peripheral nationalism in general and the "postcolonial" discourse in particular (Hardt and
Negri, 2000; Dirlik, 1997). The peripheral and post-colonialist accentuation on the politics of
difference bears a striking resemblance to the Weberian scheme of civilizational politics. By
characterizing the values of liberal democracy as Western dominant "epistemes" and
subaltern nationalism as the site ofliberation from Western domination, postcolonial theories
in fact coincide and even unwittingly reinforce the Weberian assertion that only the
Occidental civilization is privileged to and therefore deserves the ideal of justice as the basic
structure of society. In so doing, these theories have the effect of actually endorsing the
global hierarchical order, within which only the countries of the First World may afford to
harmonize their national interests with the norms that define the universalistic, cosmopolitan
aspirations of the United Nations.
This fundamental convergence is of vital importance for our understanding of the
present state of global politics. It indicates that peripheral nationalism and Eurocentricism
tend to reinforce and intensify each other in a vicious spiral, pushing the West and the rest of
the world to inevitable collision, as is evidenced in the post-9/11 world. Almost overnight,
the neo-Weberian thesis of the clash of civilizations has replaced the "end of history" scheme
to become the focal point of political imaginations in "the new wartime era.,,3
This thesis leads logically to the idea and practice of liberal imperialism or "the
liberal empire," which finds its clearest and most unabashed expression in Niall Ferguson's
recent book "America's Empire" (Ferguson, 2004; also see Harris, 2004). Underlying the
rapid growth of cultural assertiveness and "terrorist" organizations in the non-Western world,
observes Ferguson, is the prevalent and persistent failure of nation building in peripheral
countries (ibid., p. 24). By this term, he refers to the failure to create and maintain "the
institutional foundations without which markets cannot function--peace and order, the rule
of law, non-corrupt administration, stable fiscal and monetary policies" (ibid., p. 2). This
explains why, contrary to the triumphalism of the "end of history" theory, capitalism and
democracy are not naturally occurring (ibid., p. 300). What is required today, therefore, is
3 Patrick Healy, "Harvard scholar's '96 book becomes the word on war." The Boston Globe,
November 11,2001.
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"the imposition of some kind of external authority" (ibid.), namely, a liberal empire that has
the willingness and ability to do what peripheral countries cannot do on their own---create
and uphold a liberal political order. "The proper role of an imperial America," accordingly,
"is to establish these institutions where they are lacking, if necessary, by military force"
(ibid., p. 300; emphasis added).
There is little doubt that "the liberal empire" is bound to invoke an even more
powerful anti-Western surge in the peripheral world, thereby making the 2pt century a
prisoner of "the clash of civilizations."
These developments demonstrate clearly that the only solution to the deepening crises
of globalization lies in the possibility of equal development. In so doing, they bring the
problematic of peripheral justice, defined as the equal attainment of social justice, to the
center of current debates on globalization (see Chen, 2005, forthcoming). Specifically, they
force us to directly confront the toughest challenge posed by the Weberian tradition: If the
principles of justice and equality are beyond the peculiarity of the Occidental civilization,
how then may we give a full explanation as to why in the West-and only in the West--the
ideal of public reasoning by private people has been materialized?
The Liberal Logic of Eurocentricism
At the heart of the problematic of peripheral justice is a virtually logical linkage
between the liberal paradigm of the "social" and the Eurocentric perspective. This liberal
logic of Eurocentricism can be succinctly stated as follows: Given the pivotal role of the
Occidental bourgeoisie in the rise of the "social" and given the historical contingency of this
class, one may expect a permanent disparity between the Kantian West and the Hegelian
East.
A revealing illustration of the effect of this liberal logic of Eurocentricism is in
Habermas' theory of communicative action (see Chen, 2005). The theory represents arguably
the most systematic effort in the liberal tradition to demonstrate that the process of
rationalization described by Weber is beyond the peculiarity of the Occidental civilization
and "lays claim to a universal binding on all "civilized men'" (Habermas, 1984, p. 184). The
rise of "modem structures of consciousness" in the West, which for Habermas holds the key
to the formation of the bourgeois public sphere, is to be explained in terms of the
replacement of traditional forms of the ethical life by the unavoidable pragmatic
presuppositions of speech and argumentation (Habermas, 1990, p. 170). As these
presuppositions of communicative action constitute the very discursive conditions for any
mode of social formation, modem moral consciousness rooted in them can be characterized
as the self-consciousness of the universalistic properties of human communication and
thereby transcends the limits of any system of cultural givens. Habermas, however, has never
succeeded in explaining why it is the case that the same process of "de-ethicalization" has
led to the "moralization" of the social world in the West but only become the very raison
d'etre of de-moralization anywhere else.
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Even more revealing, however, is the effect of the liberal logic of Eurocentricism on
communitarian theories. Contemporary neo-Hegelians, such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair
MacIntyre, are certainly right in arguing that the liberal assumption of moral autonomy is
illusory and can hardly work anywhere. As Sandel observes, the liberal notion of the moral
self, which is presumably freed "from the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles,"
is conceptually inconsistent and practically infeasible (Sandel, 1982, p. 177). On the one
hand, the asserted moral self is bound up with a vision of the moral universe this self must
inhabit in order to free itself from the dictates of nature; on the other hand, unlike classical
Greek and medieval Christian conceptions, the universe of the deontological ethic must be
conceived of as "a world without an objective moral order" (ibid., p. 175). Yet, to imagine a
person devoid of attachments and commitments is not to conceive an ideally free and rational
agent capable of public reasoning, "but to imagine a person wholly without character,
without moral depth"-in other words, a person totally at the mercy of the dictates of nature
(ibid., p. 179).
The difficulty with neo-Hegelians, however, is that their insistence on the primacy of
the ethical life for any social formation makes it virtually impossible to explain the de facto
presence of liberal modernity in the West. How, after all, can we conceptualize the
distinction between the political and the "social" without resorting to the ethics/morality
polarity?
Not surprisingly, when forced to explain the dynamics of autonomous public life in
modem Western societies, neo-Hegelians have little choice but to tacitly embrace the liberal
presumption of moral autonomy by simply characterizing it as "a democratic form of ethical
life (Taylor, 1989; Wellmer, 1990, pp. 235-6).4 What is unique to the modem West, thus
Taylor advised us, is "the modem identity" (or "the modem inward tum") that is grounded in
the principle of respect in terms of "rights" and characterized by "the affirmation of ordinary
life" (Taylor, 1989, pp. 11-13). In this regard, "the modem selthood" buttresses "the
institutionalization of an equalitarian order," thereby contrasting starkly with the "traditional,
Aristotelian ethics" (We1lmer, 1990; Taylor, 1989, pp. 11-13). Some have even gone so far
as to suggest that liberalism "has constituted itself as a tradition precisely by creating its own
normativity out of itself' (Kelly, 1990, p. 71). In this sense, liberal modernity is also
tradition-bound.
This is only a short step from the development of a full account of how, thanks to the
emergence of "an unprecedented form of self-governing" in late medieval Europe, the West
4 From this perspective, modem identity and bourgeois institutions of self-government derives from "a
modem, Christian-inspired sense," which places ordinary life at "the very center of the good life" and
accordingly comes to acquire "civic virtues" or "civic mores" essential to self-rule (Taylor, 1989, p. 13). "To
share in self-rule therefore requires that citizens possess, or come to acquire certain qualities of character, or
civic virtues. But this means that republican politics cannot be neutral towards the values and ends its citizens
espouse. The republican conception of freedom, unlike the liberal conception, requires a formative politics, a
politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities of character self-government requires" (Sandel, 1996, pp. 5-6;
emphasis mine).
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has acquired its defining feature--"the civic tradition" or the civic way of life, which is
marked by devotion to public affairs (Putnam, 1993, p. 87) and "a steady recognition and
pursuit of the public good at the expense of all purely individual and private ends" (Walzer,
1980, p. 64). It follows that, in the non-Western world where the norms and networks of
civic engagement are lacking, the outlook for autonomous public life cannot but be bleak
(Putnam, 1993, p. 183). The fate of each nation in the modem world, therefore, was sealed
centuries ago, if not earlier (ibid.).
The Liberal Self versus the Public Ethical
In view of the intrinsic linkage between liberalism and Eurocentricism, it becomes
obvious that no solution to the problematic of peripheral justice would be possible without
seriously questioning the validity of the liberal paradigm of the "social," even if it is taken
only as a self-interpretation of the West. In other words, a theory of peripheral justice must
start with the assumption that the rise of the "social" is independent of and prior to the
historical contingency of the bourgeois class. Clearly, such a new conception of the "social"
is possible only when two crucial conditions are met. First, the rise of the "social" does not
presuppose the role of class subjectivity or any mode of "modem structures of
consciousness." Second, the self-activity of the Western bourgeoisie is actually the effect of
the public reorientation of social labor rather than its cause. In other words, it must be
assumed that the liberal paradigm of the "social" is an illusory self-interpretation of the
West, which simply cannot work anywhere, East or West.
These formidable challenges provide us with an appropriate framework for assessing
the significance of the Marxist theory of public hegemony, which was developed
respectively by Chinese Confucian Marxists (Liu, 1939) and Antonio Gramsci (1971).5
Central to this theory is the development of an "ethical" conception of the "social" that
denies any significance to the role of private autonomy in the public reorientation of material
production, representing a radical inversion of the relationship between class and the "social"
in the liberal paradigm. In this view, the real source of autonomous public life lies in the
ethical substance of traditional political society. The elevation of social labor into the public
realm, therefore, is to be understood as a historical process through which the laboring
masses re-appropriate the ethical-public sphere of political society. For this reason, the
"social" is to be conceptualized as public hegemony or the public ethical.
The starting point of this "ethical" conception of the "social" is a radical
reinterpretation of Marx's analysis of social reproduction. In sharp contrast to a variety of
"dominant ideology" or "common culture" theories that have dominated theoretical analyses
of culture and state power ever since Marx (Abercrombie et aI., 1980), public hegemony
theorists identify the mechanism of hegemony by cultural differentiation as the key to ·the
analysis of the role of the State in social reproduction in traditional political societies. In this
5 For more detailed discussions of this important Marxist theoretical tradition and its implications for
global politics today, see Chen 2005, forthcoming.
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view, the reliance of material production on the State for its reproduction in these societies
arises precisely from a fixed differentiation between social and political reproduction,
between structural and symbolic integration. The domination of the State over the toiling
masses is achieved through a deliberate creation of "symbolic isolation" of the masses. In
other words, it is achieved by a deliberate effort to prevent popular masses from becoming
"subjects" or "public selves." Once political reproduction is secured through the role of the
ruling elites as carriers of the ethical (i.e., cultivation), the structural submission of
production strata to the public authority would follow. In this sense, the monopoly of
symbolic integration (i.e., the ethical sphere) by the ruling group constitutes the basis of its
symbolic power, which in turn paves the way to its access to political and economic power
(Liu, 1939; Gramsci, 1971).
The rise of the social, from this perspective, is to be defined as the private realm's
appropriation of the ethical content (the ethico-political sphere) of the State, which is now
estranged from the State and assumes its own existence in "traditional intellectuals" and
"classical education." For this reason, the "civilized" nature or the autonomy of civil society
is best understood as the result of a historically unprecedented development: the direct
integration of the ethico-political sphere into the private realm of labor. The key to the
successful transition from natural society to civil society, therefore, lies in two historical
processes: the split between the ethical content (hegemony) and the "political society" within
the ethical State per se and the subsequent appropriation of the former by the private terrain.
"Civil society," accordingly, is to be conceived as the ethico-political sphere in the private
realm of labor. It is in this sense that Gramsci suggests to redefine civil society as "civil
hegemony" or "the image of a State without a State" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 263).
In this connection, bourgeois civil society is to be analyzed as a specific form of
public hegemony. The assimilation of the ethico-political sphere into the sphere of the
production of material life, in this view, holds the key to the secret of bourgeois subjectivity.
This process not only explains why the private realm began to assume public significance in
the early modem Europe; even more significantly, it also allows us to specify the very
conditions under which the European bourgeoisie as a modern class was born. The
appropriation of the ethico-political sphere by private sectors had been made in such a
fashion that the sphere became the private property of the dominant economic grouping, cut
off from the rest of society. Public hegemony was thus transposed to the subculture of the
dominant economic group, under the guise of its "internal" or "intimate space."
By radically reversing the liberal account of the relationship between class and the
"social" and redefining bourgeois subjectivity as the result of the bourgeoisie's monopoly of
the ethical, the theory of public hegemony suggests that bourgeois democracy is best viewed
as a "civic" mode ofdomination by cultural differentiation.
The significance of this distinctive approach to bourgeois democracy can hardly be
overestimated. It carries a number of implications that are of paramount importance for
theoretical attempts to address the problematic of peripheral justice. Since the dual role of the
bourgeois class (as the carrier of both praxis and labor) results from the appropriation of the
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 11, Number 2
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ethical domain by the realm of labor as well as the bourgeoisie's monopoly of the ethical as
its subculture, the sub society of the dominant economic group constitutes the de facto
institutional base for the formation of the public of private people in Western democratic
societies. What is characteristic of bourgeois publicity, then, is a structural split within
bourgeois society between, on the one hand, the private ethical as the institutional base of
public reasoning and, on the other, and the bourgeois public sphere as the manifestation of
bourgeois publicity.
This split is essential to our understanding of global uneven development on two
counts. Firstly, it suggests that ethnic differentiation is in fact rooted in the very nature of
bourgeois domination and constitutes an essential component of Western democratic
societies. Due to the monopoly of the dominant culture by the bourgeoisie and the
subsequent structural split between the mainstream liberal culture and the dominant
(sub)culture, acculturation or the assimilation of minorities into the mainstream culture
becomes one of the most effective mechanisms through which the symbolic isolation of
laboring masses from the dominant culture is created and the submission of non-bourgeois
laborers to bourgeois domination is secured.
Secondly, the split allows us to discern how the mechanism of symbolic isolation
through assimilation, which holds the key to civic ethnicity, has been used by European
powers to systematically create the core/periphery disparities at the global level. As in the
case of minority groups, the more a non-Western nation incorporates itself into the global
culture ofliberal democracy, the more it is symbolically isolated from the very culture of the
Western bourgeoisie that is actually the dominant culture of the capitalist world order, the
more it is marginalized within the world order, and the more it is condemned for its
"Oriental" traits. In this sense, uneven development can be properly characterized as a global
expansion of racial disparities within the capitalist core. The solution to the problematic of
peripheral justice, accordingly, lies in the possibility of constructing a public-ethical sphere
or what Gramsci terms "the public ethical State" that will serve as a school of "State life," in
which "each non-ruler" is ensured a free training in the skills necessary for governing"
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 268).
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